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We examine the following dictator game in the laboratory: The recipient has an 
opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for the dictator’s offer before the 
dictator dictates his/her offer. Our hypothesis that the dictator's offer is 
independent of the recipient's request is rejected: if the request is less than 50% of 
the pie, the dictator's offer increases as the recipient's request increases; on the 
other hand, if the request goes beyond 50% of the pie, the offer decreases as the 
request increases. We also conduct a clustering analysis to classify dictators’ 








Communication by voice is one of the most fundamental forms of activities in 
human society. It affects the fate of human beings just like economic and political 
activities do; indeed, it is often an economic as well as a political activity as exemplified 
by labor-management negotiation, customer complaints, political debates, and so forth.
1  
Game theory has studied the role of communication in strategic settings. It has 
been shown that communication serves as coordination device. A flip side of this 
observation is, as claimed by Crawford and Sobel (1982), that a coordination aspect is 
needed to make communication valid.
2  According to this view, a seemingly conflicting 
situation would also contain some coordination aspect. Consider a student making an 
effort after, rather than before, an examination to obtain a higher grade. We know from 
                                                 
1 Hirschman (1970) pointed out the importance of communication, or voice, in economic settings. He 
examined and emphasized the effects that the voice of customers and employees has on the quality of 
products and services which are deteriorated by the negligence of a firm manager. Hirschman discussed a 
wide range of phenomena from a mere complaint of a customer to a legal action taken by an insider. His 
argument, however, does not give us clear answers to some question concerning the mechanism through 
which and the extent to which cheap-talk affects others' behavior. 
2 Crawford and Sobel (1982) examined a strategic aspect of cheap-talk as information transmitting device 
in the Sender-Receiver game. Kim and Sobel (1995), Matsui (1991) and Warneryd (1991) studied the 
evolutionary mechanism in which cheap-talk comes to have this function. Dickhaut et al. (1995) and 
Kawagoe and Takizawa (1999) showed that cheap-talk can convey one’s private information and 
facilitate coordination in the Sender-Receiver Game experiment only if both players’ interests are 
sufficiently aligned. Also, see Blume et al.(1998) for an experimental study on  the evolution of  the 
meaning of cheap-talk. See surveys by Crawford (1998) and Camerer (2003) for detail. 
 3 
our experiences and observations that these requests are sometimes effective, or at least 
some students think them effective, despite that professors are often reluctant to 
conform with the request for various reasons. Indeed, even in these cases, we can still 
think that they have a common interest to some extent since the pecuniary payoff is not 
all that matter. A professor sometimes responds to the request of a student for some 
reason.  
If we follow the principle of revealed preferences, it seems obvious that 
communication matters only when there is a coordination aspect. But is it really 
obvious? Let us go back to the student’s request story.  It is true that the professor gave 
an extra credit because it was better for him/her for some reason. However, it may well 
be the case that the professor would be happier if the student did not come for the 
request in the first place. In the sense that mere speaking lowers the payoff of the 
professor, communication is not payoff-irrelevant in a narrow sense. The request of the 
student increases his payoff at the expense of the professor. 
It is the purpose of the present paper to study the effects of communication in an 
environment free of coordination aspects as much as possible by conducting a 
laboratory experiment. 
To this aim, we consider a dictator game with a “voice” option in the laboratory. 
In the dictator game, the dictator dictates how to divide a pie, and the recipient simply 
receives his/her share, i.e., unlike in an ultimatum game, he/she does not have an option 
to reject this division. In our experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a 4 
payoff-irrelevant request for the minimum offer that he/she is willing to receive before 
the dictator dictates his/her offer.  
We have several reasons for examining this game. First, in this game, unlike in, 
say, an ultimatum game, he/she cannot take any action after his/her request. If the 
underlying game is an ultimatum game, that is, the recipient has an option to reject the 
dictator’s offer, his/her request may work as a threat. Second, every subgame beginning 
with the dictator’s move is different only in the recipient’s request; hence any difference 
in dictator’s play must be caused by the difference in recipient’s voice.
3 Finally, this 
game is a strictly competitive game. Therefore, an environment free of coordination 
aspects can be realized in a laboratory at least in pecuniary payoffs. 
In this game, it is predicted not only by the standard game theory, but by the 
behavioral game theory such as the theory of other-regarding preferences, that the 
dictator's offer is independent of the recipient's request.
4 Some findings based on our 
data are as follows: the independence hypothesis is rejected; as the recipient's request 
increases, the dictator's offer increases when the requests are less than 50% of the pie; 
                                                 
3 The results in Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) seemed to imply an effect of communication. They 
conducted the following trust game experiments; the investor states a desired back transfer in the same 
time he transfers money to the trustee. Similar to ours, every subgame beginning with the trustee is a 
dictator game. However, trustee’s back transfer depends on not only investor’s request but also the 
amount of his transfer. Thus, we are not sure how and the extent to which their communication affects 
trustee’s back transfer. 
4 See, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels(2001) for “outcome-based” models, and 
Rabin(1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) for “intention-based” models. 5 
on the other hand, when the request goes beyond 50% of the pie, the offer decreases as 
the request increases. That is, “communication”, or “voice” matters without 
coordination aspects.  
We also conduct a clustering analysis to find notable different tendencies among 
dictators’ behavior. In our experimental setting, we adopted the strategy method: a 
subject who is selected by lottery to be a dictator is asked to determine a strategy, or a 
contingent plan, which prescribes the share to be given to the recipient for each possible 
request. This method enables us to study an individual behavior pattern of each subject 
as opposed to the aggregate pattern. We obtain the following three patterns of dictators’ 
behavior: 
(i) [other-disregarding] 9 out of 39 subjects belong to this cluster. The 
representative pattern of this cluster is to give no share to the recipient, 
which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the dictator game with a 
voice option;  
(ii) [punishing the greedy] 16 out of 39 subjects belong to this cluster. The 
representative pattern of this cluster is to comply with the request up to 
50% and decrease the share to be given as the request increases beyond 
50%; and 
(iii) [the lenient] 14 out of 39 subjects belong to this cluster. The 
representative pattern of this cluster is to comply with the request up to 
50% and keep 50% beyond it. 6 
Thus, voice matters in the dictator game against those who fall in (ii) and (iii). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the 
structure of the game with a voice option, game theoretic predictions for it and our 
independence hypothesis formally. Section II explains our experimental procedures. 
Section III states and studies our experimental results. Section IV provides some 
concluding remarks. Appendix contains instructions, recording sheets, and raw data. 
I. Design 
We examine a dictator game with a “voice” option in the laboratory. In the 
dictator game, the dictator dictates how to divide a pie, and the recipient simply receives 
his/her share, i.e., unlike in an ultimatum game, he/she does not have an option to reject 
this division (see Figure 1).  The size of a pie is 1,000 yen in our experiment. In the 
dictator game with a “voice” option, the recipient can either tell the minimum offer that 
he/she is willing to receive (MO) to the dictator or simply choose “not to tell,” denoted 
by φ , before the dictator dictates his/her offer (see figure 2.). MO has to be between 0 
and 1,000 yen with gradations of 100 yen. A typical element of the dictator’s offer is 
denoted by x, while MO is denoted by y. The dictator can condition his offer on MO. If 
the actual offer of the dictator is x, then the dictator receives (1,000-x) yen, and the 
recipient x yen as their rewards, respectively. 
Figures 1 and 2 are here. 7 
Denote by  ) (y px  the probability that the dictator chooses x in response to 
} 000 , 1 , , 100 , 0 , { K φ ≡ ∈Y y . Then,  )) ( , ), ( ( ) ( 000 , 1 0 y p y p y P K = gives a conditional 
probability distribution of the dictators’ choice in response to y. Let  Y y y P P ∈ = )) ( ( b e  a  
tuple of such conditional distributions.  
Our main interest is to see whether or not voice matters in the dictator game, and 
if it does, how. For this purpose, we first test the following null hypothesis that 
conditional distributions  ) (φ P  and  ) (y P ’s are identical. We call this hypothesis the 
Independence Hypothesis (IH): 
(IH) ) 1000 ( ... ) 100 ( ) 0 ( ) ( P P P P = = = = φ . 
Next, we consider some game theoretic predictions of our dictator game with a 
voice option. First, P with  ) 0 , , 0 , 1 ( ) ( K = y P  for all  Y y∈  is the unique Nash 
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the dictator keeps the whole pie regardless of the 
request of the recipient. However, several experimental researches found that the 
dictator often deviates from the equilibrium and makes a “fair” offer to the recipient in 
the laboratory (for example, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin and Sefton (1994), Andreoni and Miller (2000) and others). 
Several theoretical attempts have been made based on other-regarding preferences 
to explain such deviations.
5 We categorize these theories of other-regarding preferences 
into the following two: One is the consequentialistic, or the outcome-based, model 
                                                 
5 See more details in the survey of Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Camerer (2003). 8 
according to which players, who care about other players’ payoffs, pay attention to a 
realized outcome only. Even though a player’s interest lies only in the realized outcome, 
this model can explain both altruistic behavior and spite behavior (Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2001), Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). The other is the reciprocal, or the 
intention-based, model according to which players pay attention not only to the realized 
outcome but also to opponents’ intention behind the process inducing that outcome. 
This model can explain both positive and negative reciprocity (Rabin (1993), 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteinger (1998)).   
In our dictator game with a voice option, every subgame beginning with the 
recipient’s move is identical, so the outcome-based model as well as Nash equilibrium 
supports the Independence Hypothesis. In other words, voice does not affect the choice 
of the dictator’s offer in our game. Of course, the shape of the dictator’s choice 
distributions, ) (y P , themselves depends on the parameters of the dictator’s utility 
function.  
Furthermore, the intention-based model also supports the Independence 
Hypothesis. The positive reciprocity that returns kindness for kind behavior and the 
negative reciprocity that returns unkindness for unkind behavior are key features of the 
intention-based model. Such reciprocal behavior cannot be an equilibrium in the 
dictator game with a voice option. Since the dictator game with a voice option is a zero-
sum game, the dictator thinks that the recipient’s behavior is “kind” only if he makes an 
“unkind” offer to the recipient; on the other hand, the dictator thinks that the recipient’s 
behavior is “unkind” only if he makes a “kind” offer to the recipient. In fact, a fairness 9 
equilibrium in the sense of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) 
predicts that  ) 0 , , 0 , 1 ( ) ( K = y P  for all y. 
In summary, both Nash equilibrium and the intention-based model predict 
) 0 , , 0 , 1 ( ) ( K = y P  for all y. In the outcome-based model, the dictator’s choice 
distribution, ) (y P , can be affected by the parameters of utility functions. However, 
voice has no effect on equilibrium plays in our dictator game, either.  
II. Experiment 
Our experiment was conducted at the University of Tokyo, Komaba Campus, on 
October 23, 2003. Subjects were undergraduate students in the class of “Corporate 
Economics” in the Department of Liberal Arts. Most of the students were sophomore, 
took microeconomics in the previous semester, and would become economics major. 
They were supposed to learn game theoretic concepts like subgame perfection in this 
class, though they had not learned either subgame perfection or backward induction at 
the time of experiment. They hadn’t participated in any formal experiment in economics 
prior to this one. 80 out of 390 students were selected at random.  
In the beginning of the experiment, each subject was distributed an envelope that 
contains all the experimental materials such as instructions, a recording sheet, a practice 
problem, and an identification number card. The subjects to whom an even number is 
given as an identification number were dictators, and the others were recipients.
6 The 
                                                 
6 Of course, we did not use terms ``Dictator’’ and ``Recipient’’ in the actual experiment at all. Instead, we 
use ``Player B’’ as a dictator and ``Player A’’ as a recipient.  10 
identification numbers were also used to determine pairs in the actual experiment.  The 
identity of the opponent in a pair was informed neither publicly nor privately, and 
subjects were assigned their seats at random so that we keep subjects’ identities as 
anonymous as we can. 
To remove any experimenter’s effect, we used volunteers other than the 
researchers as instructors in this experiment. 
7 One of the instructors read aloud the 
instructions of the experiment. Written instructions were also distributed to each subject. 
Before the actual experiment, subjects were told to solve practice problems to confirm 
their understandings of our dictator game and the instructions of the experiment. 
In the actual experiment, we followed the strategy method.
8 That is, a dictator and 
a recipient made decisions simultaneously as follows. The recipient chose between “to 
tell MO” and “not to tell.” If he/she decided “to tell MO,” the amount of MO, y, was 
chosen as well. The dictator dictated his/her offer, x, for each possible choice of the 
recipient before he/she knew the actual choice made by his/her opponent. These 
decisions were made once and for all. The experiment was conducted manually. Session 
                                                 
7 As is well known, Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994) developed a double blind method to 
keep anonymity among subjects as well as between experimenters and subjects, and it become standard 
method to conduct bargaining experiment such as the ultimatum game, the dictator game, trust game etc. 
Unlike their experimental design, we employed the one room experiment that all subjects were in the 
same room. Our design is reflected by a confounding effect of double blind method reported by Frohlich, 
Oppenheimer, and Moore (2001). They pointed out that double blind experiments might endanger doubts 
in subjects regarding the existence of pairings and the disposition of any money they share. 
8 See more details of strategy method in Selten (1967). 11 
time was about one and half hours and twenty minutes was spent for instruction and 
practice. The average reward was about 1,000 yen and the participation fee, 500 yen, is 
included. The reward was paid in cash privately to each subject about one hour after the 
experiment. 
III. Results 
We use 39 pairs of data for our analysis because one of them was incompletely 
written. To see how the dictators responded to the voice of the recipients, the relative 
frequency table is given in Table 1.
9  
Table 1 is here. 
The column is the recipient’s choice,  Y y∈ , and the raw is the amount of the 
offer made by the dictator, x. Each column can be regarded as a sample population 
density for each y. There are 39 data for each y because the dictators made their 
decisions against all y’s under the strategy method. It seems that each sample population 
density is different for each y. As representative cases, let us focus on the cases of 
φ = y  and y  = 500. In each case, the amount of offer made by a dictator, x, is 
distributed between x = 0 and x = 500. While x is concentrated near x = 0 for  φ = y , x is 
distributed around x = 500 for y = 500. Furthermore, over 50% of  the offers satisfy x = 
y for y between  0 and 500. That is, almost a half of the offers made by the dictators are 
equal to MO if MO is less than or equal to a half of the pie. If MO exceeds 50% of the 
                                                 
9 See also Figure 3 that describes the relative frequency of x for each y.   12 
pie, this tendency disappears; the amount of the offer made by a dictator decreases as 
MO increases. The greater MO is, the larger the variance of the distribution becomes. 
Figure 4 is here. 
To see more details of the distributions of x, a box plot is shown in figure 4. In 
this box plot, the vertical-axis is the amount of x and the horizontal-axis is y. The top 
line of the box corresponds to the third quartile (75% percentile), the bottom line of the 
box to the first quartile (25% percentile), the line within the box to the median. Since 
there are cases that the third quartile is equal to the median, we also put a dark mark on 
the line of the median. The line segments associated with the top and the bottom of the 
box shows the maximum and the minimum values, respectively. The mode is shown as 
a triangle. Next, let us confirm our general findings mentioned above using this box plot. 
At  φ = y , one can see that the distribution of x is concentrated on 0 since the 
median and the mode is at x = 0. On the other hand, at y = 500, the distribution centers 
around 500 since the mode is x = 500 and the median is also close to it (400). We can 
also see that the median monotonically increases between y = 0 and 500 and decreases 
between y = 600 and 1000. Furthermore, note that the third quartile, the median, and the 
mode are all equal to y between y=0 and 400. On the other hand, the distribution tends 
to decline toward the mode, x =0, when y is greater than 500.  
Now, we use the Friedman two-way analysis of variance by ranks to test the null 
hypothesis that the twelve responses to the voice have been drawn from the distributions 13 
with the same median.
10  To do it, we first transform each individual’s data into ranks, 
i.e., we rank each response from the first to the twelfth.
11 Let  j M  be the median of the 
responses to the voice j (j=φ , 0, 100, …,1000). Then the null hypothesis is written as: 
1000 100 0 0 : M M M M H = = = = L φ  
and the alternative hypothesis is: 
. : 1 v and u some for M M H v u ≠  
The Friedman’s value after adjusting ties approximately follows a 
2 χ  distribution for 
the present data set with  11 = df . The value we obtained is 
, 04 . 114 = r F  
which exceeds the critical value 31.26 for the significance level of 1%. Thus, we reject 
the null hypothesis. In other words, voice matters in the present game. 
Since we obtain the significant result, we proceed to the multiple comparisons. The 
absolute differences of the sums of the ranks for the pairs of y’s in Y are shown in Table 
3.
12  Three notable tendencies are the following: 
                                                 
10 See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for the Friedman two-way analysis. 
11 If there is a tie, give them an average rank. For example,  the data (0,0, …,0) is transformed into (6.5, 
6.5, …, 6.5), and (5, 10, 5, 2, 2, …,2) to (2.5, 1, 2.5, 8, 8, …, 8). 
12 Each absolute difference follows a normal distribution with a proper variance. The critical value is the 
abscissa value from the unit normal distribution above which lies 0.05/(11*12) percent of the distribution. 
Note that in the present context, the Friedman analysis of variance is more suitable than the standard 
analysis of variance for a randomised block design with one treatment variable experiment since we do 
not presuppose that samples are from the normal distribution. It should be noted here that the standard 
analysis of variance induced the wider range of pairs that lead to significant differences. 14 
(1) the response (offer) to a “modest” request is significantly below that to a request 
for a relatively “fair” division; 
(2) the response to “not-to-tell” is significantly below that to a request for a relatively 
“fair” division; and 
(3) the response to an “aggressive” request is significantly below that to a request for 
a relatively “fair” division. 
Combining this test with the earlier observations of the present section, we may 
conclude that a dictator tends to give more to a recipient if the request is a “fair” one 
than otherwise.  
Table 3 is here. 
So far we have paid attention to the aggregate behavior of the subjects. From 
now on, we would like to see the individual behavior. In doing so, we will classify the 
subjects’ behavior into some prominent patterns, or clusters. Since there is no theory, to 
the best of our knowledge, to give us clear understandings of our results, such a 
clustering analysis may help us to develop the basis of our future modelling of the 
subjects’ behavior.  
Note that, according to Figure 3, the first quartile is 0 for any y and that at least 
25% of the offers are 0 for each y even though the mode is equal to MO in the case of 
500 0 ≤ ≤ y . So one can deduce from these aggregated data that there are at least 25% 
of subjects who offer 0 in the case of  500 0 ≤ ≤ y .  On the other hand, the variances of 
the distributions are still large though the mode is 0 and the distribution tends to biased 
toward 0 in the case of  1000 600 ≤ ≤ y . According to Table 1, about 25% of offers are 
around x = 500 for any y between 600 and 1000. Therefore, one can deduce from these 15 
aggregated data that there are 25% of the subjects who offer about 500 if 
1000 600 ≤ ≤ y  holds.   
To confirm these observations, we differentiate some behavior patterns by a 
hierarchical cluster analysis of Ward’s method.
13 We use SAS to conduct this analysis. 
The dendrogram representing a clustering process is shown in Figure 5.
14 When R-
square is 0.6, we find three clusters which have notable features and refer to the 
representative behavior patterns in these three clusters as other-disregarding, punishing 
the greedy, and the lenient, respectively. We show the dictators’ behavior in each cluster 
by using the box plots. 
Figure 6 is here. 
  The first cluster (other-disregarding): Nine subjects, or 23% of the whole 
subjects, belong to this cluster. The box plot of dictators’ choices for each y is shown in 
Figure 6. The subjects’ behavior, choosing 0 for any y, are consistent with the unique 
Nash equilibrium. Thus, the reason that the first quartile is always 0 in the aggregated 
data is that subjects who belong to this cluster always choose 0. 
                                                 
13 In a hierarchical cluster analysis, each individual data with multiple attributes is regarded as a point in 
a multidimensional space, then data showing similarity according to an appropriate distance measure are 
combined each other. A cluster is composed by applying above process repeatedly. In Ward’s method, at 
each step, the marginal increment in the within-cluster sum of squares is minimized over all partitions 
obtainable by merging two clusters from the previous step. See more details of Ward’s method in 
Anderberg (1973). 16 
Figure 7 is here. 
The second cluster (punishing the greedy): Sixteen subjects, or 41% of the 
whole subjects, belong to this cluster. The box plot for dictators’ choices for each y is 
shown in Figure 7. Comparing Figures 3 and 7, one may realize that the median and the 
mode in this cluster are almost the same as those in the aggregated data. The 
representative dictator in this cluster offers x = y, i.e., the offer is equal to the request, if 
500 0 ≤ ≤ y . We do not identify any representative feature for  φ = y  since a large 
variance of offers is observed for this case. There seem to be two subclusters in this 
cluster for  1000 600 ≤ ≤ y , though we do not conduct a formal clustering analysis to 
find them. In one subcluster, the dictator always offers x = 0, while in the other, the 
dictator gradually decreases the amount of offer as the request increases. In fact, there 
exist two modes at y = 600 and 700. If y is greater than 700, the mode is x = 0 only, but 
the median tends to decrease relatively slowly. Anyway, a decreasing tendencies of 
offers beyond y=500 are the representative behavior in this cluster. 
Figure 8 is here. 
The third cluster (the lenient): Fourteen subjects, or 36% of the whole subjects, 
belong to this cluster. The box plot of dictators’ choices for each y is shown in Figure 8. 
First, the median and the mode coincide with those in aggregated data for  φ = y  and 
500 0 ≤ ≤ y . As in the second cluster, the representative behavior in this cluster is that 
x=y holds, i.e., the dictator offers the same amount as MO, if  500 0 ≤ ≤ y . We cannot 
                                                                                                                                               
14 Other SAS outputs are in Appendix B. 17 
identify any representative feature in the case of  φ = y  since a large variance of offers 
is observed in this case. On the other hand, the median and the mode of dictators’ offers 
in the case of  1000 600 ≤ ≤ y  are almost equal to 500 and the variance of the 
distribution is rather small. It means that the representative dictator offers x = 500 
regardless of MO if it exceeds 500.
15 The reason that the offer of x = 500 does not 
disappear in the aggregated data even though the distribution tends to be biased toward 
x = 0 in the case of  1000 600 ≤ ≤ y  is that the subjects in this cluster always choose x = 
500 regardless of MO. 
In summary, we have identified three behavior patterns through the clustering 
analysis of Ward’s method. The game theoretic player offers x = 0 regardless of MO. 
The lenient complies with the request if it is below 500 and keeps the amount x = 500, 
otherwise. The punishing the greedy complies with the request up to the equal 
allocation and decreases the offer x as the request y increases beyond it. The patterns 
that reject the Independence Hypothesis are the last two, which comprise of 77% of the 
whole subjects. In both patterns, the representative behavior is to comply with the 
recipient’s request if  500 0 ≤ ≤ y .
16 
Figure 9 is here. 
                                                 
15 One may think that 500 yen or a half of the pie is reserved in subject’s mental accounting to help the 
other players as suggested by a fixed total sacrifice theory reported in the Selten and Ockenfels (1998)’s 
solidarity game experiment. 18 
Finally, the relative frequency of recipients’ choices is shown in Figure 9. At a 
glance, the distribution is centered around y = 500. Thus, most of the recipients 
correctly chose MO that maximizes their payoffs based on the expectation of dictators’ 
behavior mentioned above.  
IV. Conclusions 
In this article, to examine an effect of communication in conflicting situations, we 
studied a dictator game with a voice option. In our experimental results, the voice of the 
recipient can have significant effect on determining the allocation of the pie even 
though the recipient has no control power on the allocation. Further, the amount of 
offers made by dictators is increasing with respect to MO when MO lies between 0 and 
500 yen. On the other hand, the amount of offer tends to decrease relatively slowly 
beyond 500 yen.  
In our experiment, we follow the strategy method. In the strategy method, 
dictators forced to specify their actions for every possible y before they observe real 
choices of recipients. By that method, we could obtain dictators’ reactions for each 
value of y. If we don’t follow the strategy method but the sequential method, that is, 
when dictators choose their offers after they observe MO stated by recipients, there is 
                                                                                                                                               
16 We can also observe three clusters which have the same features as above by using others hierarchical 
clustering methods (e.g. the centroid method, UPGMA (unweighted pair-group method using arithmetic 
average), and the within-group average method). 19 
no guarantee that subjects behave same way in our experiment that employs the strategy 
method
17.  
It is well known that in a dictator game, subjects react dramatically to slight 
changes in experimental designs. For example, Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith 
(1994), employing double blind method to keep anonymity among subjects as well as 
between experimenters and subjects, found that subjects offer the amount that is closer 
to the Nash equilibrium than those of previous experiments reported. Hoffman et al. 
(1994) also introduced endowment effect by which they assigned the right to be the 
dictator to the winners for simple intellectual tasks. Such arrangements also induced 
selfish behavior in their experiment. Bohnet and Frey (1999) considered the 
environment in which the dictator can see the identity of the recipient but the recipient 
cannot. When the dictator hears the recipient’s personal information in such an 
environment, they reported that the dictator behaves more altruistically.
18 One can ask 
us whether our results may change by introducing these experimental designs. 
If we can regard our y = “not to tell” case as ordinary dictator games, we have 
more altruistic behavior in the case of y = “to tell,” especially y = 500 than those in 
ordinal dictator games. As Nagel (1970) said, if altruism is based on the cognition of the 
existence of others, communication may contribute to inform the dictator of the 
                                                 
17 Brandts and Charness (2000) reported the differences of subjects behaviors between hot (sequential 
method) and cold (strategy method) experiments. 
18 See Camerer (2003) for others examples of dictator games experiments. 20 
existence of the recipient. Of course, it is necessary to examine that our y = “not to tell” 
case can really be regarded as ordinary dictator games.  
As we see in the previous section, our experimental results can be explained 
neither by the standard game theory nor by the behavioral game theory. Indeed, neither 
the “outcome-based model” that players only care about the pecuniary outcome of the 
game nor the “intention-based model” that incorporates players’ reciprocal intentions 
explains our results. In these models, players’ preferences or motivations are based 
solely on the outcomes of the game and available strategies. But, as Gintis (2000) 
stressed, we cannot separate subjects’ preferences and motivations from their social 
experiences that are obtained before they enter the laboratory. Following this view, we 
must note that it might be dangerous for us to explain our experimental results solely by 
the structure of the game. 
A reasonable explanation might be that the subjects apply their past experiences to 
the present experimental task. They search similar social situations applicable to the 
present experimental task that they face. Then they apply appropriate behavioral norms, 
which have been suitable for their past experiences, to the current situation. In this way, 
subjects choose their strategy choices. We learn some norms or behavioral principles 
from various social experiences. For example, consider the following commandment in 
the bible or the golden law of morality, “just as you want men to do to you, you also do 
to them likewise
19.”  Such a behavioral norm is different from a strategy in the sense of 
game theory since this norm does not address to a specific person but to anonymous, 
                                                 
19 New Testament, King James Version, The Gospel According to Luke, 6.31. 21 
and what is good to do depends on others’ wants. But it is possible that subjects use 
such a behavioral norm in the experiment. Constructing a theory based on these ideas is 
an important topic for future research. 
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The percentage terms are rounded off to one decimal places.  27 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of x
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Figure 4: A box plot of dictators’ choices for each y  29 
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Figure 5: Cluster analysis using the Ward's method
20 
 
                                                 
20 See Appendix A for row data of each observation number (OB).  Each observation number 












Table 4: Descriptive statistics of x (the first cluster)
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Figure 6: A box plot of dictators’ choices for each y (the first cluster)  32 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of x (the second cluster)
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Figure 7: A box plot of dictators’ choices for each y (the second cluster) 33 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of x (the third cluster)
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Figure 9: The distribution of relative frequency of recipients’ choices 35 





                                                 
21 Each pair consists of subjects with the same number. Note also that each subject's number does not 
correspond to his/her ID number in a laboratory.   
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Appendix B.  SAS outputs 
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Appendix C. The instructions 
The decision problem in the experiment you participate is very simple. If you 
carefully read and follow the instructions, the amounts of money you will earn in the 
experiment are directly paid in cash after the experiment is over. 
Cautions 
Do not talk to anyone and any eye contact is forbidden. If you do such things, we 
will demand you exit from the experiment. If you have a question, please raise your 
hand quietly. The instructors respond appropriately. Do not exit from this room during 
the experiment. Turn off your beep phone. 
The player whose identification number is odds is called player A and the other, 
that is, the player whose identification number is even, is called player B. 
Check the contents in your envelope 
Your will find the following materials in your envelope. Please check whether or 
not you have all of these in your envelope. If you don’t have any of them, please let us 
know by raising your hand quietly. 
(1) The instructions (this copy) 
(2) A recording sheet 
(3) Practice problems and an answer sheet 40 
General instructions 
Each pair is consisted with two players, player A and B, and the membership in 
your pair has been determined by us before the experiment. 1,000 yen is allotted to each 
pair as a total reward for both players.  Each player in the pair decides how to share that 
money according to the following rules. First player B is given 1,000 yen from the 
instructors. Player A can ask player B at least how much he/she is willing to receive. 
The amount player A asks is called the minimum offer that he/she is willing to receive. 
Then player B decides the amounts, x, he/she is willing to give to player A. This is the 
end of experiment and player A receives x and player B 1000-x yen respectively as their 
rewards. 
Every subject participates in the experiment in the same room (Room 742).  Don’t 
exit from the room during the experiment. Next we will tell you more details of 
experimental procedures. 
Experimental procedures 
0.  First of all, we would like you to solve practice problems. These are easy 
test to confirm your understanding of the game you will play. The time 
for solving them is three minutes. After that, the instructors will gather 
your answer sheet. 
1.   Please confirm the identification numbers for you and your opponent 
printed on the top of your recording sheet. 41 
2.  Player A and B do the following tasks simultaneously within four minutes 
when the experiment starts. 
Player A: Mark “to tell” in the first column if you would like to tell 
player B the minimum offer that you are willing to receive and mark “not 
to tell” if you would not. Then mark one of any 100s from 0 to 1,000 yen 
in the second column when you have marked “to tell” in the first column.  
Player B: Mark any one of 100s from 0 to 1,000 yen for all possible 
amounts that player A can choose.  
3.  Please put all the experimental materials but the identification number 
into your envelope of A4 size after your decision-making is done.  
4.  The instructors gather your envelope of A4 size from you. This is the end 
of the experiment. 
Your reward 
After your decision-making is done, the instructors determine the outcome of the 
game for each pair. Please note the following things. 
(1)  The amounts you earned in the experiment do not affect your grade in 
this class. 42 
(2)  Practice problems are used to confirm your understandings of the rule of 
game you play. The score does not affect your grade in this class. But 
you will not be paid if you leave any of questions unanswered. 
(3)  You will also not be paid if you do not write your recording sheet 
properly as the instructions explain. For example, marking twice in the 
same column, no marking, etc. Of course, your grade is not affected by 
such mistakes. Note also that you will receive as much reward as you 
can if your opponent does not write recording sheet properly. 
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